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Abstract 
 
I explore the extent to which insufficient labor market flexibility is an important factor causing 
Central and East European (CEE) economies to perform worse than they could and hence slowing 
down their readiness to enter the European Union. My conclusion is that labor market flexibility 
is an issue but that it is not a major factor in comparison to imperfections and regulations in other 
areas such as the housing market, transportation infrastructure, capital market, corporate 
governance, legal framework, and business environment. In particular, my assessment is that 
transition labor markets have been as flexible and functional as labor markets in the market 
economies and that the observed differences across transitional labor markets do not account for 
cross-country differences in economic performance. 
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Non-technical Summary 
 
Since 1989, most transition economies have experienced a period of sharp economic 
decline followed by slower than expected economic growth, a rise of the unemployment 
rate from zero to double digits, and appearance of a high share of long-term unemployed. 
These developments have naturally raised concerns that insufficient labor market 
flexibility is an important factor causing these economic problems and that it is slowing 
down the readiness of the Central and East European (CEE) economies to enter the 
European Union. My conclusion, based on the evidence reviewed in this paper, is that 
labor market flexibility is an issue but that it is not a major factor in comparison to 
imperfections and regulations in other areas such as the housing market, transportation 
infrastructure, capital market, corporate governance, legal framework, and business 
environment. In particular, my assessment is that transition labor markets have been as 
flexible and functional as labor markets in the market economies and that the observed 
differences across transitional labor markets do not account for cross-country differences 
in economic performance. My conclusion is based on the following findings: 
 
1.  The extent and effects of employment protection, labor market policies and 
unionization in the transition economies are similar to OECD and EU averages, 
and on some measures they resemble OECD economies with the most flexible 
labor markets.  
2.  The transition economies with the least regulated and institutionally least rigid 
labor markets have not been uniformly the fastest growing ones and vice versa.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
 
3.  The firms in CEE economies quickly resembled their western counterparts in the 
extent to which they started adjusting employment in response to changes in 
wages and output demand.  
4.  Substantial labor mobility took place from the old to the new firms, with some 
countries transferring over one-half of the labor force within four to five years. 
5.   Labor mobility appears to have been rational in that it has involved both quits 
and layoffs, with the resulting wage gains being higher on average for the quitters 
than the displaced workers. Workers have reacted to labor demand shocks by 
traditional as well as less-traditional (in the western context) responses, including 
massive occupational mobility. Hence, where a carpenter in the US might react to 
losing a job by finding a job elsewhere as a carpenter, a laid off Russian nuclear 
physicist might stay in his city and look for a job as a banker. 
6.  The return to education and other forms of human capital have risen substantially 
and wages began to play an equilibrating role in the labor market. 
 
From the policy standpoint, there are several important findings. First, the generosity 
of unemployment benefits has been found to have only modest negative effect on 
efficiency in terms of extending unemployment spells. This provides policy makers with 
latitude in setting the parameters of the compensation system so as to ensure popular 
support for the completion of the transition process. Second, economies with high 
unemployment tend to have fewer vacancies and estimated parameters that show lower 
efficiency of matching between the unemployed and vacancies and lower probability 
(hazard) of the unemployed leaving unemployment for employment. The lack of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
 
vacancies points to low demand as a cause of unemployment, while the matching and 
hazard estimates suggest that these economies suffer from structural issues such as skill 
mismatch, inferior functioning of labor market institutions and active labor market 
policies, and less flexible behavior of employers and workers. Third, there are indications 
that wages are not set completely by market forces because they vary with firms’ 
profitability. This in turn suggests that worker-insiders raise wages at the expense of 
greater employment, which in turn contributes to the unemployment problem. 
 
The above findings suggest that the principal reasons for the rapid but uneven rise in 
unemployment and the share of long-term unemployed in transition economies in the 
1990s were (a) the enormous extent of transition-related restructuring, with labor demand 
falling dramatically in existing firms, (b) a major skill mismatch that took varying periods 
of time to alleviate, and (c) varying degrees of imperfections and regulations in other 
areas such as the housing markets, transportation infrastructure, capital markets, 
corporate governance, legal framework, and business environment. 
 
The outstanding issue, however, is why there has been a significant resurgence of 
unemployment in some of the growing economies (Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovakia) but 
not in others in the very late 1990s and early 2000s. These are presumably not brought 
about by sudden bouts of transition-related restructuring, skill mismatch and newly 
created imperfections outside of the labor market. Demographic forces (especially a 
recent baby boom-let) account for some of these developments, but further research is 
needed to clarify this issue. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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1. Introduction 
The fall of communism created expectations that the centrally planned economies 
would generate rapid economic growth and gradually catch up with middle income 
developed countries as they moved to a market system. Yet, the relative performance of 
the transition economies since 1989 has fallen short of expectations for three principal 
reasons: advanced western economies did unusually well in the 1990s; the economic 
problems associated with the transition were underestimated; and policymakers made a 
number of errors. The question therefore arises as to what has worked and what could 
have been and still could be done better. 
In this paper I provide an assessment of the extent to which labor market 
institutions and regulations in Central and East European (CEE) economies have 
contributed positively or negatively to economic performance since 1989. An 
understanding of the role played by the labor markets in the CEE countries, apart from 
being of interest per se, is important for at least four reasons. First, at a fundamental level 
an analysis of the functioning of nascent labor markets provides clues about the 
functioning of one of the basic pillars of a market system. The transition provides an 
interesting laboratory, with tremendous variation in key variables, as exemplified for 
instance by the rise of unemployment rates rose from zero to double digits in most CEE 
economies and the sizable declines in wages and employment in firms during the first 
years of the transition. Analyses of the labor market are hence able to capture the “big 
bang” effect of introducing a market system. From the policy standpoint a particularly 
important issue is why the unemployment rate rose fast in the early 1990s in some but not 
all countries, and why it recently stabilized in the single digit range in some CEE William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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countries (e.g., the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia), but rose to the 15-
20% range in others (e.g., Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia). It is notable that the significant 
rise in unemployment in the CEE countries in the early 1990s occurred despite major 
declines in labor force participation, competitive devaluation of the currencies, reductions 
in formerly generous unemployment benefits, and introduction of active labor market 
policies.  
Second, there is an important political consideration since voters’ response to high 
unemployment has been quite negative in all the CEE countries. The discontent reflects 
anxiety that reforms require economic sacrifices without ensuring adequate social 
security. A major policy question therefore arises as to how the transition economies can 
strike a balance between (i) reducing further government intervention and completing the 
establishment of market incentives, and (ii) providing an adequate social safety net that 
ensures public support for these policies.  
Third, in the context of accession to the European Union, the policy debate has by 
and large moved from macro stabilization (which continues to be essential but requires 
standard policies) to microeconomic issues such as the rate of creation of new firms, 
corporate governance in existing firms, enforcement of a market-friendly legal 
framework, enhancing the functioning of a flexible labor market, and attracting foreign 
direct investment. A significant emphasis has been placed on the link between 
unemployment and the wage and employment setting in the newly created firms, 
privatized versus state owned firms, and foreign owned firms. Labor market analyses 
may be particularly useful in providing policy guidance in this area. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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Fourth, the economies of Central and East Europe were the first ones to launch 
the transition process and they differed from one another in their initial conditions, 
policies and outcomes. The results of studies dealing with these economies therefore 
provide useful information for the policy makers in the economies that started transition 
later.
1 
The initial labor market conditions varied across the CEE countries. While it was 
functioning, the Soviet-type economic system was characterized by full employment of 
labor (zero open unemployment) and centrally set wages, prices and output targets for 
state-owned enterprises. Income distribution was maintained at relatively egalitarian 
levels, most people were required to work and enterprises were allocated funds to provide 
the needed jobs. Starting in the 1960s, however, many CEE countries experienced 
slowdowns in economic growth and, as a result of popular pressure, the system started 
undergoing reforms. Full employment at centrally set (and low) wages was maintained 
but in many countries the requirement to work (e.g., for housewives) was not fully 
enforced. Rather than merely soliciting information and imposing targets, central 
planners increasingly engaged in bargaining with enterprise managers about plan targets, 
employment levels and financial allocations. Firms increasingly operated under soft 
budget constraints, being able to receive bailouts from the central authorities when 
producing losses. Moreover, firms could increasingly trade with one another outside of 
the scope of the central plan and in some countries, e.g., Poland and Hungary, workers 
                                                      
1 Poland and Hungary for instance entered the transition with a significant private sector in agriculture and 
services and limited government control over enterprises. In contrast, the Czech and Slovak economies 
were highly centralized and almost completely state-owned. Yet, the Czech Republic and to a lesser extent 
Slovakia have carried out massive privatization of state property, while others, such as Bulgaria, Poland, 
and Romania, have been slower in privatizing their state sector. Some, such as the Czech Republic, have 
pushed through massive privatization, leaving the restructuring of firms for later. Others have stressed more William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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and managers seized a significant degree of control over enterprises from the planners. 
By the time of the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the system was rapidly disintegrating in 
countries such as Poland and Hungary, but it still remained fairly intact in East Germany 
and Czechoslovakia. 
The economic strategy during the transition consisted of what I have called Type I 
and Type II reforms (Svejnar, 2002). Type I reforms were launched rapidly in all the 
transition economies and they focused on the removal of the authoritarian state and 
introduction of basic policies aimed at softening up the impact of the transition. At the 
micro level, the goal of Type I reforms was to move towards the liberalization of prices, 
reduction of direct subsidies to trusts and state-owned enterprises, allowing trusts and 
firms to restructure or even break up, removing barriers to the creation of new firms and 
banks, carrying out small scale privatizations, and introducing a new social safety net. 
These reforms caused a sizable reallocation of labor away from the state-run firms, some 
of which went to the new private firms and some of which ended up in nonemployment.  
Type II reforms have emphasized the creation of a reliable state apparatus that 
would provide a level playing field for the market economy and enhance its functioning. 
They have been more fundamental than Type I reforms and the extent of their 
implementation has varied across the transition economies. These reforms have involved 
the development of new laws, regulations and institutions that would ensure a successful 
market-oriented economy. They have included the in-depth development of labor market 
regulations and institutions related to industrial and labor relations, unemployment 
compensation and retirement systems, privatization of large and medium-sized 
                                                                                                                                                              
the commercialization of existing state enterprises (e.g., Poland), reorientation of exports from east to west, 
attracting western capital (Hungary), and creating new firms. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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enterprises; establishment and enforcement of a market-oriented legal system and 
accompanying institutions; further in-depth development of a viable commercial banking 
sector and the appropriate regulatory infrastructure, and assistance for the creation and 
growth of new firms. 
   The nature and extent of Type II reforms that have been carried out in different 
economies should, along with differences in initial conditions and exogenous shocks, 
provide the possibility to explain differences in economic performance across the 
transition countries. Note that the four leading transition economies shown in Figure 1 -- 
Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, and Slovakia -- have pursued a relatively complete set of 
reforms, including maintaining relatively clear property rights and corporate governance. 
The Czech Republic belongs to the leading group but it underestimated the importance of 
the latter two sets of reforms and was the only economy in Central Europe to suffer a 
recession in the second half of the 1990s. Reforms in other countries have been more 
limited.
2   
In the next section, I discuss the principal differences in the institutional and 
regulatory framework in the transitional labor markets and examine the extent to which 
they provide an explanation of relative economic performance of the CEE countries. 
 
 
 
                                                      
2 For example, Hungary and to a lesser extent Slovakia privatized most state-owned enterprises in a way 
that assigned clear property rights. Poland and Slovenia proceeded slower, but both countries exposed the 
state-owned enterprises to competition and a risk of financial failure. In all four economies there was also 
substantial creation of new private firms that contributed to growth. The Czech Republic is notable because 
it was similar to the four leading economies but it neglected the need to establish a functioning legal 
framework and corporate governance. The privatization experience of the Czech Republic, Russia and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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2.  Institutions and Regulation in the Transition Labor Markets 
The transition countries have differed considerably in the nature and speed of the 
development of labor and social regulations and institutions and the differences have 
been substantial even within clusters such the CEE countries.  
Employment Protection 
Building on their existing legislation and using the assistance provided by the 
International Labour Office (ILO) and the European Union (EU), the transition economies 
established various forms of employment protection legislation in the 1990s. By the end of 
the 1990s, the CEE candidates for admission to the EU have developed a set of labor market 
institutions and regulations that broadly resemble those found in the EU countries (Riboud, 
Sanchez-Paramo and Silva-Jauregui, 2001). The CEE countries in fact fall in the middle of 
the EU-based flexibility index used by Riboud et al. (2001) – the index takes on values of 1 
to 6, with higher values corresponding to stricter employment protection legislation. They 
have therefore adopted employment protection legislation that is less flexible than those 
found for instance in the United Kingdom and Ireland, but more flexible than those found in 
the southern countries of the EU.  
As in the EU, however, there are important differences across the CEE countries 
in terms of the exact nature and extent of employment protection. Riboud et al. (2001) 
show that in the late 1990s rules for hiring and firing of permanent workers (including 
notification requirements and severance payments) as well as rules related to collective 
dismissals were more flexible in Hungary and Poland than in the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Legislation related to temporary employment was in turn much more 
                                                                                                                                                              
Ukraine suggests that mass privatization in the absence of a functioning legal system has negative effects 
on performance. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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flexible in the Czech Republic and Hungary than in Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Overall, among 26 OECD and CEE countries classified by Riboud et al. (2001), the leading 
six EU candidate countries in CEE hold the following ranks and value of the employment 
protection index, respectively: Hungary (9; 1.7), Poland (10; 2.0), Czech Republic (11; 2.1), 
Slovakia (16; 2.4), Estonia (18; 2.6), and Slovenia (25; 3.5). 
  In terms of analytical and policy implications, if employment flexibility matters 
for a country’s economic performance, we should observe better economic performance, 
ceteris paribus, in Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic than in Slovakia, Estonia and 
especially Slovenia. Yet, as may be seen from Figure 1, the labor market flexibility 
ranking of countries does not coincide with their ranking in terms of GDP growth during 
the 1990s, with Slovenia being the second fastest growing economy and the Czech 
Republic the slowest one. Other factors than labor market flexibility obviously affect the 
rate of growth of GDP, but the lack of a tight relationship with labor market flexibility is 
notable. 
Passive Labor Market Policies for the Unemployed 
Already by the end of 1991, all the CEE countries developed relatively well-
functioning unemployment compensation and social security benefit schemes (principal 
pillars of their passive labor market policies). As they struggled to strike a balance 
between providing an adequate social safety net and reducing government intervention, 
while controlling budget deficits, CEE governments gradually reduced the level of 
protection in unemployment (Ham, Svejnar and Terrell, 1998). In particular, already by 
1992-93 all the CEE countries required an individual to have a minimum period of previous 
employment in order to be eligible to collect unemployment compensation. Moreover, in all William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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of the CEE countries, except Albania, the level of unemployment benefits was based on 
fixed replacement rates of previous wages and, except for Bulgaria and Poland; these 
replacement rates fell over the entitlement period.  All the CEE countries, except Poland, 
also imposed a low maximum level of benefits (between 1.4 and 2.0 times the minimum 
wage). Finally, there was no indexation of benefits for inflation in any of the CEEs. 
As was the case with employment protection, by the late 1990s the nature of 
passive and active labor market policies of the EU candidates started resembling policies 
pursued in the EU and diversity occurred across countries. Riboud et al. (2001) show that 
the replacement ratio (ratio of unemployment benefits to previous wage) is very low in 
Estonia (about 10%), relatively low in Poland (40%) and somewhat low in the Czech 
Republic (50%). In Hungary (64%), Slovakia (60%) and Slovenia (63%) the replacement 
ratio resembles the EU average of 60%. The duration of unemployment benefits in 
months is only 3-6 in Estonia and 6 in the Czech Republic. It rises to 6-12 in Slovakia, 12 
in Hungary, 2-24 in Slovenia, and full 12-24 in Poland. These figures compare to 6 
months in the United States, 12 month in the UK, 24 months in Spain and no limit in 
Belgium. The coverage rate (percentage of unemployed receiving unemployment 
benefits), which proxies for eligibility, also shows striking differences across countries, 
with the rate having been stable in the 1990s at about 40-50% in the Czech Republic and 
Estonia, and at 70-75% in Hungary.  In contrast, the coverage rate has fallen continuously 
in the 1990s from 80 to 20% in Poland and Slovakia and from 40 to 30% in Slovenia. 
Except for Poland, the CEE countries spend a much smaller share of GDP on 
unemployment compensation (passive policies) than the EU and OECD average, and all, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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including Poland, spend much less than the EU and OECD average in terms of GDP 
share per unemployed person. 
Hence, if the generosity of unemployment benefits has a negative effect on a 
country’s economic performance by reducing worker incentives to find and keep jobs, the 
countries that should have performed relatively well, ceteris paribus, are Estonia, Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, while performance should have been hindered in Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia. However, as was the case with employment protection policies, the 
observed GDP growth outcomes in the 1990s (Figure 1) do not correspond to this 
ranking, thus suggesting that other more important factors have been at play as 
determinants of GDP growth. 
Active Labor Market Policies 
  These policies cover many activities, including job search assistance, training of 
the unemployed and direct job creation. The overall spending as a percentage of GDP by 
the CEE countries on these policies is below that of the EU countries and is hence closer 
to that of the US. Within the CEE candidates for EU admission, Riboud et al. (2001) find 
that both the share of GDP spent on active policies and share of GDP spent on active 
policies per unemployed person are very low in Estonia and the Czech Republic, while 
they are relatively high in Slovenia and to a lesser extent in Slovakia, Hungary and 
Poland. In examining these findings in relationship to Figure 1, it is clear that the relative 
economic performance of the CEE countries in terms of GDP growth since 1989 has been 
better in countries with higher expenditures on active labor market policies. This finding 
is interesting and goes in the right direction – countries that spend more on providing 
skills, jobs and matching of workers and jobs grow faster. The problem is that micro William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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studies in transition economies have had a hard time identifying a positive effect of active 
labor market policies (Munich, Svejnar and Terrell, 1998). The question for future 
analytical research is therefore whether the benefits of active labor market policies 
exceed their costs and whether the net benefits are sizable enough to make a substantial 
difference in terms of GDP growth. 
Trade Unions 
  While trade unions in the former Soviet bloc countries have changed from 
institutions of Communist party control and distributors of fringe benefits to becoming 
representatives of workers’ economic interests, their power, especially in the private 
sector, appears not to be substantial. Riboud et al. (2001) calculate union density to be 
about 60% in Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia, and much lower in the Czech Republic 
(43%), Estonia (36%) and Poland (34%). This yields CEE average union density of 49%, 
which is somewhat higher than the EU average of 44% and OECD average of 40%. 
Union coverage (ability to extend the union contract to non-union workers) is low in the 
Czech Republic and Estonia, but it is higher in the other four EU admission candidate 
countries. In the multi-union context of the CEE countries, coordination among various 
trade unions is low in all the CEE countries except for Slovenia.  Overall, the values of 
the three measures of trade union power – density, coverage and coordination – do not 
appear to be good predictors of the relative GDP growth of the CEE countries since 1989. 
Payroll Taxes 
  The need to control budget deficits during the 1990s has led most transition 
economies to impose relatively high payroll taxes. By the late 1990s, payroll taxes ranged 
from 33% in Estonia, to 38% in Slovenia, 44% in Hungary, 47.5% in the Czech Republic, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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48% in Poland, and 50% in Slovakia. These tax rates are well in excess of the EU 
average rate of 24%. While wages in the CEE countries were initially so low that the 
payroll tax rates often did not represent a major burden, the situation changed as real 
wages grew in the mid and late 1990s. The fact that the two countries with the highest 
payroll tax rates (Poland and Slovakia) also have the highest unemployment rates points 
to a possible link between labor cost and (un)employment, a topic that I take up in the 
next section. However, as with the other measures of relative labor market regulations or 
institutional rigidities, the relative rate of economic growth of the CEE countries during 
the 1990s is not related in a simple way to the payroll tax burden. 
In concluding this section, let me point out that in Russia and the other countries 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States, labor market regulations and institutional 
developments have been weaker than in CEE countries. Moreover, the official 
unemployment benefits were lower to start with and decreased dramatically in real terms 
over time -- and some were not paid at all. The relatively poor economic performance of 
the transition economies further east (see Figure 1) has thus occurred with less rather than 
more labor market regulation and institutionalization. 
3. Empirical  Evidence 
  In this section, I provide a selective review of the conclusions that may be drawn 
from analytical studies of transitional labor markets. This evidence is a useful 
complement of the review of institutional and regulatory developments in the preceding 
section. For more in-depth reviews of analytical studies of the transitional labor markets, 
the reader is referred to Svejnar (1999) and Boeri and Terrell (2002). 
Employment Adjustment and Wage Setting at the Firm Level William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
  12
  In most transition economies, the employment decline reached 15-30 percent in 
the 1990s. A continuous decline was observed in Russia, Slovakia and Romania; an L-
shape pattern detected in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia; a U-shape pattern in Poland; 
and a sideways S-shape pattern in the Czech Republic. When combined with the GDP 
data in Figure 1, the employment data suggest that restructuring in the transition 
economies involved an initial decline in labor productivity as output fell faster than 
employment and a subsequent rise in productivity as output and employment stopped 
declining. But a note of caution is in order here. With production shifting from large to 
small firms, the decline in employment (and output) may be less pronounced than 
suggested by the official data, since small firms are harder to capture in official statistics. 
State-owned enterprises in all the transition economies rapidly decreased 
employment and/or real wages in the early 1990s. In Central Europe, the greatest initial 
reduction in industrial employment occurred in Hungary (over 20 percent), followed by 
Slovakia (over 13 percent), Poland (over 10 percent), and the Czech Republic (9 percent). 
The downward adjustment in industrial wages in the early 1990s proceeded in reverse 
order and amounted to 24 percent in the Czech Republic, 21 percent in Slovakia and 1 
percent in Poland. Hungarian real wages in industry actually rose by 17 percent (Basu, 
Estrin and Svejnar, 2000). In Russia and the rest of CIS, the adjustment brought a mixture 
of wage and employment adjustment (Desai and Idson, 2000) and the wage decline was 
more pronounced than in central and eastern Europe (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). While real 
wages in Central and East Europe have increased considerably after their initial decline, 
in Russia and a number of other CIS countries real wages declined until 1993 and 
stagnated or increased only moderately in the mid-to-late 1990s (Svejnar, 1999; EBRD, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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2000). The trajectory of real incomes has thus been very different in the more and less 
advanced transition economies. 
Basu, Estrin and Svejnar (1997, 2000) estimate that labor demand elasticities with 
respect to output and wages were significant in the more marketized pre-transition 
economies (Hungary and Poland) and that they rose rapidly in all of Central Europe as 
the transition was launched.  The sharp decline in output at the start of the transition was 
hence reflected in the labor market, but depending on the institutional setting in a given 
country, it was absorbed more by employment or wage decreases. The empirical evidence 
on labor demand hence indicates that the labor markets were quite flexible from early on, 
but that the flexibility has different manifestations in different countries.  
The empirical studies also indicate that, except for Poland, wages were set 
relatively independently of firms’ performance under communism. During the transition, 
wages started to vary systematically with revenues per worker, suggesting that rent 
sharing has become a phenomenon in the CEE economies.
3 Interestingly, evidence from 
Bulgaria suggests that the compensation of chief executives in not fully state-owned 
firms is positively related to labor productivity (Jones and Kato, 1997). 
Firm ownership and legal form (type of registration and hence corporate 
governance) are not found to have a simple and uniform effect on employment or wages. 
In the large samples, covering the early transition period, there appears to be no uniform 
employment effect, while in the smaller samples that extend further into the transition 
period, one finds some evidence that privatized firms may at first reduce employment and 
then increase it faster over time. Finally, foreign ownership appears to be increasing 
                                                      
3 This relationship is not found in some studies, however, when total revenue rather than revenue per 
worker is used as an explanatory variable. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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employment (and output). There is also some evidence that private firms tend to pay 
higher wages than other firms, but the evidence is not robust and relates only to some 
countries.  Finally, unlike with data on individuals, within firm-level studies there is little 
evidence that wages are negatively related to local unemployment (wage curve effect). 
Unemployment 
As may be seen from Table 1, within two years after the start of the transition, the 
unemployment rate rose from zero into double digits in most economies of Central and 
East Europe. For example, by 1993 the unemployment rate reached 16 percent in 
Bulgaria and Poland, 12 percent in Hungary and Slovakia, 10 percent in Romania, 9 
percent in Slovenia, but only 3.5 percent in the Czech Republic. The high unemployment 
rates reflected high rates of inflow into unemployment as firms laid off workers, and 
relatively low outflow rates as the unemployed found it hard to find new jobs. The Czech 
labor market was an ideal model of a transition labor market, characterized by high 
inflows as well as outflows, with unemployment representing a transitory state between 
old and new jobs (Ham, Svejnar and Terrell, 1998, 1999, Svejnar 1999, and Boeri, 2000). 
Unemployment rose more slowly in the Commonwealth of Independent States and the 
Baltic countries, as firms were slower to lay off workers and used wage declines and 
arrears as devices to hold on to workers (Boeri, 2000, and Boeri and Terrell, 2002).  
  Over time, the patterns of unemployment have shown considerable 
differentiation. The Czech Republic was the only Central European country to enter 
recession in the second half of the 1990s and its unemployment rate correspondingly rose 
to 8 percent. The fast-growing economies of Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and to a lesser 
extent Slovakia managed to reduce their high unemployment rates in the late 1990s. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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Conversely, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltic countries 
experienced gradual increases in unemployment as their transition proceeded. A turning 
point occurred by 1999-2000 as the unemployment rate rose again in Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. It stabilized in countries such as Hungary, 
Romania and Russia. As may be seen from Table 1, with the exception of Hungary, 
Slovenia and Romania, transition economies have recently had unemployment rates that 
are at least as high, and often significantly exceed, those observed in the European Union. 
  In view of the high unemployment rates in all the CEE economies in the 
early to mid 1990s except for the Czech Republic, the studies of unemployment in these 
countries have focused on the determinants of outflow from unemployment into 
employment and on the efficiency of matching of the unemployed and vacancies. A 
particularly intriguing issue has been the difference in unemployment between the Czech 
Republic and the counterpart republic of Slovakia (and by implication the other CEE 
economies). Ham et al.’s (1998, 1999) estimates of hazard models suggest that about one-
third of the difference between the Czech and Slovak expected unemployment durations 
is brought about by differences in observable demand conditions, while the remaining 
two-thirds is brought about by different coefficient of the estimated hazards (proxying for 
different behavior of individuals, firms and labor market institutions). The second 
principal finding of the hazard estimates from several countries is that the generosity of 
the unemployment compensation scheme has only a moderate negative effect on 
efficiency in terms of lengthening an unemployment spell. Finally, the estimated 
coefficients on the demographic and demand variables indicate that minorities (e.g., 
Romanies in the Czech and Slovak Republics or non-Slovenians in Slovenia), William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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handicapped, the least educated, and often also the single and the old unemployed 
workers have a harder time than others obtaining jobs. The estimated effects of gender 
and marital status vary across countries and specifications. A number of studies find that 
the probability of moving from unemployment to employment is negatively related to 
local unemployment rate.  
The results of the matching function studies indicate that great care must be taken in 
collecting, aggregating and adjusting the data, specifying the functional form and selecting 
the estimating procedure. In particular, there is some evidence that the usual assumptions of 
a Cobb-Douglas form and constant returns to scale may be rejected when these factors are 
carefully taken into account. The exceptionally low unemployment rate in the Czech 
Republic as compared to Slovakia and the other Central and East European economies 
appears to have been brought about principally by (1) a rapid increase in vacancies along 
with unemployment in the Czech Republic, resulting in a balanced unemployment-vacancy 
situation at the aggregate as well as district level, (2) a major part played by vacancies and 
the newly unemployed in the outflow from unemployment, (3) a matching process with 
strongly increasing returns to scale throughout (rather than only in parts of) the transition 
period, and (4) ability to keep the long term unemployed at relatively low levels. The 
matching function studies hence provide complementary evidence to the hazard estimates in 
that they identify local demand factors (vacancies) and the efficient behavior of agents and 
institutions (high returns to scale in matching) as being key to the low unemployment 
situation in the Czech Republic. Some, but not all, of the studies point to the importance of 
active labor market policies in increasing the efficiency of matching. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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Job Destruction, Job Creation and Labor Mobility 
  The reduction in employment in the old state-owned firms, rise in unemployment 
and establishment of new firms have brought about considerable destruction and creation 
of jobs, as well as mobility of labor. Contrary to the main models of the transition 
process, Jurajda and Terrell (2001) show that job creation in new firms is not necessarily 
tightly linked to job destruction in the old firms since many new jobs have been created 
even in economies (such as the Czech Republic) that experienced low rates of job 
destruction. They also show that in both Czech Republic and Estonia more than one-half 
of the labor force moved from old to newly created firms within a short period of 4-5 
years. Sabirianova (2000) provides a related structural insight, namely that much of the 
labor mobility consisted of occupational rather than geographic change, with individuals 
moving from one occupation to another within regions, as jobs in old occupations were 
destroyed and opportunities in new occupations were created. Compared to the U.S. labor 
market, where individuals move more geographically than occupationally, the transition 
is a special phenomenon in that it has led to more occupational than geographic mobility.  
Provision of Fringe Benefits 
While data limitations prevent one from drawing strong conclusions about the 
provision of fringe benefits by firms in CEE countries, the Polish and Czech evidence 
suggests that benefits are more prevalent in state-owned and privatized firms than in 
newly established private firms. Moreover, the evidence from the Czech Republic and 
Romania suggests that firms that have restructured may be exploiting the incentive 
aspects of fringe benefits.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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Returns to Human Capital 
  With the exception of East Germany and to some extent possibly men in Bulgaria, 
the various studies indicate that returns to education increased during the transition as 
compared to the pre-transition period. This suggests that education acquired under 
communism has a higher payoff during the transition but that a rapid introduction of a 
market economy and western wage scales, as happened in East Germany with the 
unification, may result in a decrease in the payoff to this human capital. The studies also 
indicate that women enjoyed a higher rate of return on education than men under 
communism and that the gap narrowed as the transition started. In several countries, there 
is evidence that return to experience obtained under communism fell during the 
transition. 
Income Distribution 
  The communist countries had highly egalitarian income distributions. In central 
and east Europe, the Gini coefficients ranged from 20 in Czechoslovakia and Slovenia to 
25 in Poland in the late 1980s. The 1988 Ukrainian Gini coefficient of 23 (based on 
survey data) and the 1991 Russian coefficient of 26 based on the registry wage data of the 
Russian Statistical Office (Goskomstat) suggest that income distribution was relatively 
egalitarian in the former Soviet Union as well. However, inequality increased during the 
1990s, with the Gini coefficient reaching 26-34 in central and east Europe, 30 in Ukraine 
and 40 in Russia. These coefficients bring inequality in the transition economies into the 
range spanned by capitalist economies from the relatively egalitarian Sweden to the 
relatively inegalitarian United States, and in line with developing countries such as India. 
However, while the central and east European data seem to reflect reality, the Russian William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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and Ukrainian data may well understate the extent of inequality. In particular, the 
Goskomstat data are based on wages that firms are supposed to be paying to workers, but  
many Russian firms have not been paying contractual wages (Desai and Idson, 2000). 
Inequality measures based on survey data from the Russian and Ukrainian Longitudinal 
Monitoring of households suggest that income inequality in Russia and Ukraine has 
reached much higher levels – a Gini coefficient of 47-50 – which resembles the level of 
inequality found in developing economies with relatively inegalitarian distribution of 
income. The egalitarian structure of income distribution in central and eastern European 
countries has been brought about by their social safety nets, which rolled back inequality 
that would have been brought about by market forces alone (Garner and Terrell, 1998). 
Conversely, the Russian social safety net has been regressive -- it has made the 
distribution of income more unequal than it would have been without it (Commander, 
Tolstopiatenko and Yemtsov, 1999). 
  Overall, the income distribution data indicate that the regulatory and institutional 
frameworks of the transition economies have been flexible enough to give rise to wider 
income differentials. In Central and East Europe, the governments used social transfers to 
cushion the impact of market forces and reduce extreme inequalities in income and 
consumption. 
4.  Concluding Observations 
Since 1989, most transition economies have experienced a period of sharp economic 
decline followed by slower than expected economic growth, a rise of the unemployment 
rate from zero to double digits, and appearance of a high share of long-term unemployed. 
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flexibility is an important factor causing these economic problems. My conclusion, based 
on the evidence reviewed in this paper, is that labor market flexibility is an issue but that 
it is not a major factor in comparison to imperfections and regulations in other areas (not 
explored in this paper) such as the housing markets, transportation infrastructure, capital 
markets, corporate governance, legal framework, and business environment. 
At some level of abstraction, high unemployment rate is obviously a manifestation of  
labor market imperfections. For example, in a simple spot labor market there should be a 
low enough wage at which the market clears and observed unemployment is frictional. 
Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia, with 2001 unemployment rates of 15-20%, are obviously 
above the frictional level of unemployment, as are arguably most other transition 
economies. However, the spot market model, while useful as a yardstick, misses 
important real-world phenomena even when minimum wages are very low. From a policy 
standpoint, it is therefore useful to ask whether labor markets in the transition economies 
perform worse than those in functioning market economies.  
My assessment is that transition labor markets have been as flexible and functional as 
labor markets in the market economies and that the observed differences across 
transitional labor markets do not account for cross-country differences in economic 
performance. My conclusion is based on the following points: 
1.  The extent and effects of employment protection, labor market policies and 
unionization in the transition economies are similar to OECD and EU averages, 
and on some measures they resemble OECD economies with the most flexible 
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2.  The transition economies with the least regulated and institutionally least rigid 
labor markets have not been uniformly the fastest growing ones and vice versa.  
3.  Estimated labor demand elasticities quickly rose to western levels, indicating that 
firms started adjusting employment to output demand and wage shocks. 
4.  Substantial labor mobility took place from the old to the new firms, with some 
countries transferring over one-half of the labor force within four to five years. 
5.   Labor mobility appears to have been rational in that it has involved both quits 
and layoffs, with the resulting wage gains being higher on average for the quitters 
than the displaced workers. Workers have reacted to labor demand shocks by 
traditional as well as less-traditional (in the western context) responses, including 
massive occupational mobility. 
6.  The return to education and other forms of human capital have risen substantially 
and wages began to play an equilibrating role.  
From the policy standpoint, there are several important findings. First, the generosity 
of unemployment benefits has been found to have only modest negative effect on 
efficiency in terms of extending unemployment spells. This provides policy makers with 
latitude in setting the parameters of the compensation system so as to ensure popular 
support for the completion of the transition process. Second, economies with high 
unemployment tend to have fewer vacancies and estimated parameters that show lower 
efficiency of matching between the unemployed and vacancies and lower probability 
(hazard) of the unemployed leaving unemployment for employment. The lack of 
vacancies points to low demand as a cause of unemployment, while the matching and 
hazard estimates suggest that these economies suffer from structural issues such as skill William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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mismatch, inferior functioning of labor market institutions and active labor market 
policies, and less flexible behavior of employers and workers. Third, there are indications 
of rent-sharing by workers, which may signal the presence of an insider-outsider 
problem. 
The above findings suggest that the principal reasons for the rapid but uneven rise in 
unemployment and the share of long-term unemployed in transition economies in the 
1990s were (a) the enormous extent of transition-related restructuring, with labor demand 
falling dramatically in existing firms, (b) a major skill mismatch that took varying periods 
of time to alleviate, and (c) varying degrees of imperfections and regulations in other 
areas such as the housing markets, transportation infrastructure, capital markets, 
corporate governance, legal framework, and business environment. 
The outstanding issue, however, is why there has been a significant resurgence of 
unemployment in some of the growing economies (Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovakia) but 
not in others in the very late 1990s and early 2000s. These are presumably not brought 
about by sudden bouts of transition-related restructuring, skill mismatch and newly 
created imperfections outside of the labor market. Demographic forces (especially a 
recent baby boom-let) account for some of these developments, but further research is 
needed to clarify this issue. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 496 
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